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I 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
HOW TO DESIGN INVEST KOREA’S EVALUATION SYSTEM TO 
MAXIMIZE THE POSITIVE IMPACTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESMENT 
 
By 
 
Yoon Ye Chan 
 
 
 
This paper analyzes the evaluation system of Invest Korea (IK), to test if it is optimally 
designed to maximize the positive impact of foreign direct investment (FDI). Since the 
financial turmoil which swept Korea in late 90s, FDI has been one of driving forces in 
economic policy, leading to foundation of Invest Korea. In spite of largely impressive 
record so far, the jury is still out for its role in FDI attraction. Inconsistency and 
irrelevancy from external evaluation frame have clearly prevented Invest Korea from 
fulfilling its maximum potential, as is internal frame, which is marked with excessive 
emphasis on investment amount and heavy burden of project management. Case study 
of Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA) reveals how unpractical and 
ineffective the evaluation frame is. The thesis will suggest number of recommendations 
to boost the efficiency of Invest Korea, including reducing the number of projects, more 
focus on strategic sectors, and setting a more reasonable target.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since financial crisis has stormed Korea in late 90s, Korean government has made 
significant efforts to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Considered as an extremely 
closed economy prior to the crisis, complete ineptitude to react quickly to economic 
turmoil and unprecedented volatility in financial market, which eventually lead to 
emergency rescue package from International Monetary Fund (IMF), has persuaded 
Korean government to rethink its stance over FDI. Many post-crisis analyses pointing 
out that a lack of FDI was one of the main reasons Korea was hard hit, as portfolio 
investors are not as attached and long-term as direct investors, thus paving way for 
capital exodus to trigger as well as amplify the crisis also strengthened Korea 
government’s conviction to open its economy to FDI.  
The most notable move by Korean government to signal its intention to endorse FDI 
was foundation of Korea Investment Service Center (KISC), its national investment 
promotion agency (IPA). Since its foundation in 1998, later transformed to Invest Korea 
(IK) in 2003, it has represented Korean government’s unparalleled dedication to 
establish Korea as a top investment destination. But it was not just Invest Korea, but 
newly formed Free Economic Zones (FEZ) and regional governments where FDI 
suddenly became of great importance.  
After more than 10 years, it is widely regarded that not only the amount of investment 
has increased, but overall contribution of FDI to national economy have been invaluable. 
The investment amount reported to Korean government, for example, has risen 
significantly and has steadied at around 10 billion USD per year for the last 5 years, 
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albeit notification terms. But there are still heated debates whether FDI is so important 
to the extent that it takes such a high place on government agenda. FDI skeptics argue 
that the overall economic impact of FDI is not as great as it is thought, while others 
claim that granting incentives to foreign companies only because they are foreign, while 
domestic companies are not applicable, is de-facto reverse discrimination, ironically, 
decreasing domestic companies’ chance of survival. Alleged national sentiment against 
foreign investors, often described as conqueror, not savior, did not help the cause either. 
At the same time, a series of studies categorically insist that FDI can be beneficial to 
recipient country, provided well managed by its government.  
FDI is believed to be able to lead to output growth as well as efficiency and productivity 
gains in the hosting country, though it could differ across individual industries (Carmen 
Fillat Castejón and Julia Wörz, 2006). This is particularly true to lagging economies 
such as Asia in second half of 20th century. In a more micro term, Jan Hagemejer and 
Joanna Tyrozicz (2009) argued that companies with foreign shareholding have a 
tendency to have higher profits, invest more, and are more efficient and more export-
oriented, even if that may have been self-selection bias, where companies with 
established export markets attract FDI more easily than others. 
Then, it is fairly reasonable to conclude that the real impact of FDI lies somewhere 
between, and good management from the government is vital to maximize the positive 
impacts of FDI. As a national investment promotion agency, Invest Korea has 
epitomized how Korean government has approached FDI. Thus, by reviewing Invest 
Korea’s record, FDI management record in Korea can be analyzed. 
One of the major obstacles to the study is a lack of precedent academic researches to 
review the performances of IPAs. It is truly remarkable since there are more than 240 
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investment promotion agencies all around world as registered members of World 
Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA). Adding regional promotion 
agencies will make the number even higher. Yet, most of the studies on FDI focus on 
economic, social and political impacts on hosting or investing countries, while there are 
a few studies which focused on the influence of promotion activities over investment 
destination, such as tax holiday and business environment. Rare studies on IPAs are 
mostly done through World Bank’s The Investment Climate Advisory Service (FIAS), 
or World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA). Global Investment 
Promotion Benchmarking 2009 (World Bank) points out that timely provision of 
information is of great importance to IPAs to stimulate market interest and attract 
investment. Thus, it is critical for any IPA to ensure that relevant, up-to-date, and good-
quality information is available through its website to potential investors. Furthermore, 
a choice of target industries, preparation for materials that answer questions frequently 
asked by investors, identification of investors’ key location drivers are also referred to 
assess the IPA’s capacity. Marie Therese Gabriel (2004) argues that, while exogenous 
factors such as market size and factor endowments have larger impact in investment 
destination, endogenous factors like budget and staff can also influence the efficiency of 
IPA. Jacques Morisset and Kelly Andrews-Johnson (2004), while acknowledging the 
importance of investment climate and level of development, also put emphasis on 
financial commitment, calling for big enough budget. In terms of type of activities, 
investment generation and targeting, which have been prioritized by most of IPAs, are 
turned out to be least relevant functions, usurped by policy advocacy activities.  
The thesis will look at how Invest Korea has operated for the last decade, especially 
focusing on the evaluation system. The focus is to test if current evaluation system of 
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Invest Korea is optimally designed so that it can maximize the positive impact of FDI. 
The following chapter will look through the general FDI situation in Korea, including 
historical trend, FDI promotion policies such as incentives and legal structure. That is 
followed by the review of how Invest Korea has evolved since its foundation in 1997. 
Structural frame and most importantly, its performance evaluation system, external and 
internal ones, will be visited. The thesis then tests if Invest Korea has successfully 
developed its evaluation system to maximize the potential to achieve its goal. And if not, 
a couple of recommendation will follow. A case study of Netherlands Foreign 
Investment Agency (NFIA) will complement the necessary suggestions to be made later. 
 
2. FDI in Korea and Introduction of Invest Korea 
 
2.1. FDI Trend in Korea 
Korea has never been famous for its openness. Having adopted firm state-controlled 
economic development policy since 1960s, foreign investment has been strictly limited 
to so-called ‘strategic industries’. Tight control over foreign currency market as well as 
frequent intervention to financial system has also contributed to make Korea one of the 
most difficult places to do business for international companies.  
The liberalization of financial market and emergence of multi-national companies 
(MNC) in 90s, which all resulted in increase of FDI, were irreversible and it had 
become more and more obvious that Korea had to open its economy sooner or later. But 
there is no doubt that financial crisis by which Korea was devastated was a sole catalyst 
to put the inevitable forward.  
FDI was not very active until late 90s, when it soared dramatically, largely due to fire 
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sale of former affiliates of conglomerate and financial institutions severely exposed to 
insolvency, all of which attributable to financial crisis. Since then, FDI amount has 
more or less steadied around 10 billion USD per year, still great leap from earlier days. 
Actual arrival figure reads somewhat less than notification, but it does not change the 
obvious fact FDI amount in Korea has significantly increased.  
 
Figure 1: FDI Trend in Korea 
 
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
 
In terms of nationality, US have been inarguably the biggest investor, followed by Japan 
and Netherlands, though most investments from Netherlands are treaty-shopping, 
actively benefiting from favorable tax regime. 
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Table 1: FDI in Korea by Country 
Country 
No. of 
Notification 
Amount 
(mil USD) Country 
No. of 
Notification 
Amount 
(mil USD)
USA 8,861 41,807 Malaysia 728 7,045 
Japan 10,793 23,890 Singapore 1,004 5,915 
Netherlands 1,143 18,897 Hong Kong 1,175 4,035 
Britain 1,081 10,001 Canada 591 3,934 
Germany 1,475 8,973 Total 46,562 160,511 
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
 
In terms of industry, service is edging over manufacturing as a biggest industry, 
reflecting Korea’s industrial structure. Service sector is expected to be more dominant 
as it has been outpacing other sectors as structural shift to service sector is due to 
continue for the foreseeable future.  
 
Table 2: FDI in Korea by Industry 
Industry 
No. of 
Notification 
Amount 
(mil USD) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Livestock, Fisheries and Mining 278 441 
Manufacturing 14,568 63,213 
Service 30,973 90,282 
Electricity, Gas, Water and Construction 743 6,575 
Total 46,562 106,511 
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
 
One notable character is the dominance of green-field investment over merger and 
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acquisition (M&A). While around 70% of world FDI is M&A transaction, Korea has 
shown exactly the opposite, with strong green-field investment. That is partly due to 
Korea’s closeness to foreign ownership, delicately maneuvered by Korean government.  
 
Table 3: FDI in Korea by Type 
Type No. of Notification
Proportion
(%) 
Amount 
(mil USD) 
Proportion
(%) 
M&A 3,838 8.24 47,528,018 29.61 
Greenfield 42,724 91.76 112,983,652 70.39 
Total 46,562 100.00 160,511,670 100.00 
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
 
2.2. Investment Attraction Policies in Korea 
Most of the organizations have clear goal or mission, in the form of investment return 
maximization in case of private sector, or less quantitatively measurable public utility in 
public sector. In Invest Korea’s case, its mission states that its sole purpose is 
‘supporting the entry and successful establishment of foreign business into Korea’. But 
further up the organizational structure leads to Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE), 
which has final jurisdiction on FDI. MKE clearly states that its goals regarding FDI 
policy are investment attraction with high potential of spillover in job creation as well 
as technology, and foundation of steady and stable investment inflow. Those goals 
should be filtered through its investment attraction policy. 
While it is not uncommon to offer incentives to foreign investment, more and more 
countries are implementing ‘national treatment’, applying equal and even playground 
and fair competition regardless of company’s nationality. However, Korea is publicly 
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boasting that it offers the most generous incentives schemes among countries in 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Potential 
disadvantages to domestic company and fear of abusing the scheme could not stop 
Korean government. 
 
2.2.1. Tax Relief 
Under the Tax Exemptions and Exceptions Act, foreign investor is eligible for tax 
exemption or reduction ranging from income tax to dividend income, acquisition tax, 
registration tax and property tax provided the investment meets a set of requirements.  
 
Table 4: National and Local Tax Reduction to Foreign Investment Project 
Category Eligible Industries Proportion 
1. High Degree Technology 
Business & Industry Support 
Service 
- 
Reduction for 7 years
(100% 5 years, 
50% next 2 years) 2. Stand-alone Type Foreign 
Investment Area 
Manufacturing: 30 million USD
Tourism: 20 million USD 
Logistics: 10 million USD 
R&D: 2 million USD 
3. Complex Type Foreign 
Investment Zone 
4. Free Economic Zone 
5. Free Trade Zone 
Manufacturing: 10 million USD
Tourism: 10 million USD 
Logistics: 5 million USD 
Reduction for 5 years
(100% 3 years, 
50% next 2 years) 
Source: Invest Korea, Guide to Investing in Korea, 2009 
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2.2.2. Cash Grant 
Inarguably the most favorable and powerful, but also controversial incentive scheme is 
cash grant. Cash grant will cover 5% or higher of total investment project, which 
supposedly has profound impact on domestic economy. Such powerful is the scheme 
that the evaluation requires highest standards, like high degree technology and 
technology transfer effect, redundancy with domestic investment, impact on regional / 
national economy, survivability of the project, numbers of jobs created, and location 
adequacy. Cash grant has not been awarded frequently since its introduction in 2004, 
and it was not until French chemical firm Rhodia became the first beneficiary of the 
scheme in 2006, after more than 2 years since its introduction. So far, 7 companies have 
been awarded, and one more case is under preliminary stage.  
 
Table 5: Investment Project where Cash Grant were Awarded  
Year 
Investor 
(Country) 
Industry 
Investment 
Amount 
Grant 
(bil KRW)
Stage 
2006 
R 
(France) 
Fine Chemical
45 bil KRW 
(47.4 mil USD)
4.47 
(10%) 
Finished 
2008 
S 
(Belgium) 
Fine Chemical
21.5 bil KRW
(18 mil USD)
2.02 
(9.4%) 
Conclusion of Contract
Payment in progress
2008 
I 
(Netherlands)
Machinery 
(Cutting Tool)
100 bil KRW
(83.3 mil USD)
7.3 
(7.3%) 
Conclusion of Contract
Payment in progress
2009 
A 
(Japan) 
LCD 
Precision Glass
374.8 bil KRW
(27.8 bil JPY)
10 
(6%) 
Conclusion of Contract
Payment in progress
2009 
B 
(Germany)
Automobile 
Parts 
230 bil KRW
(190 mil USD)
36.8 
(15%) 
Conclusion of Contract
Payment in progress
2009 
B 
(USA) 
ICT 
Semiconductor
R&D 
56 bil KRW 
(49 mil USD)
7.2 
(13%) 
Notice of award 
Source: Invest Korea 
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2.2.3. Site Location Support 
There are three different locations, Foreign Investment Zone (FIZ), Free Trade Zone 
(FTZ), and Free Economic Zone (FEZ), where foreign investor is eligible for favorable 
treatments. While FTZ was first introduced in 1970 during the industrialization period, 
opening door even to domestic companies, the other two are designed mainly to attract 
foreign investors. Most location supports are directed to FIZ, though FEZ also offers 
comprehensive support for foreign investor. 
 
Table 6: Location Support in Foreign Investment Zone 
Category Details 
Lease Site Support
(Site Purchase) 
- Provide leases site through designation and purchase of foreign 
invested area 
- Share of purchase cost 
* Capital region: Country 40%, Local government 60% 
* Non-capital region: Country 75%, Local government 25% 
Rent Reduction 
(National Property)
- Stand-alone foreign invested area 100% 
- Over 1 million USD in high degree technology business: 
Complex type foreign invested area 100%, industrial complex 
50% 
- Over 5 million USD in general manufacturing business: 
Complex type foreign-invested area 75%, industrial complex 50%
※ Rent reduction of shared property shall be determined through 
regional laws 
Subsidy for 
Difference 
in Sales Price 
- Subsidies to be provided for the difference when selling 
industrial complexes to foreign invested companies for less than 
the development costs (share is the same as lease site support) 
Source: Invest Korea, Guide to Investing in Korea, 2009 
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2.2.4. Other Incentives 
Strict regulations applicable to domestic companies can be relaxed specifically to 
foreign companies, notably restriction on total investment amount. Under the Anti-
Monopoly Act and the Fair Trade Act, domestic company groups with more than 10 
trillion won in total assets of domestic companies in the same group (total investment 
amount restricted company group) are not allowed to acquire or hold shares of other 
domestic companies above the amount of 40% of its net asset (investment limit amount). 
However, there are no restrictions on the total investment amount in acquiring or 
holding shares of foreign invested companies with one foreigner holding more than 
10% of issued shares.  
Tight control over business activities in overcrowding control areas can be also eased. 
While domestic companies with factories of 500 and wider square meters are banned 
from expansions, transfer, or change to business type in that area, foreign companies are 
relieved.  
 
2.3. Invest Korea as a National Investment Promotion Agency 
 
2.3.1. Organization and Operation 
Invest Korea is Korea’s national investment promotion agency. Its origin is Korea 
Investment Service Center (KISC), established in 1998 in the middle of financial crisis. 
It was a bold move by Korean government, signaling its commitment and determination 
to liberalize the Korean economy drastically. 5 years on, with a view to more 
comprehensive promotion, KISC was transformed into Invest Korea in 2003.   
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As a promotion agency, its primary job is to implement government policies on foreign 
investment that have been formulated by the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE), 
formerly Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, and coordinated by the Foreign 
Investment Committee, which is chaired by the Minister of Strategy and Finance. 
 Invest Korea is not an organization on its own, but a division of Korea Trade and 
Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), a government affiliated organization.  
 
Figure 2: Korea’s Investment Promotion System 
 
 
Invest Korea has 3 sub-divisions and 11 teams in the headquarters. Foreign Investment 
Ombudsman, though legally independent, also works in Invest Korea, leading 
investment aftercare team on permanent basis. This particular ombudsman system, 
exclusively dedicated to foreign investor, is widely hailed as a success, landing “Best 
Practices in Aftercare Services Award” presented by WAIPA in 2007.  
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Figure 3: Invest Korea’s Organization 
 
 
Meanwhile, Invest Korea has 39 overseas offices, where actual promotions are taking 
place. Most of the offices are located in developed countries, identified as “core”. But 
Invest Korea has been trying to explore untapped market of late, such as India, Malaysia, 
Russia, China, and Middle East classifying as “supporting”. Those 39 offices are not 
exclusively dedicated to Invest Korea, however, as they are officially KOTRA’s branch. 
Thus, not all the personnel are working on investment promotion, though most branches 
have at least one dedicated investment manager. Even then, not every investment 
manager has investment promotion on his/her only agenda, as other KOTRA activities 
are likely involved. It is more so in a small branches like Helsinki and Melbourne, 
where only one person is in charge of every operation.  
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Table 7: Oversea Offices in Invest Korea and Number of Investment Managers 
Region Core Function Support Function 
North 
America 
(18) 
Regional Headquarter(2), New York(1), LA(2), 
Detroit(2), Toronto(2), Dallas(1), Vancouver(2), 
San Francisco(2), Chicago(2), Washington(2) 
 
Europe 
(22) 
Regional Headquarter(2), London(2), Paris(2), 
Frankfurt(1), Munich(1), Brussels(1), Milano(2), 
Helsinki(1), Wien(1), Madrid(2), Stockholm(1), 
Amsterdam(2), Copenhagen(1), Hamburg(1), 
Zurich(1) 
 
Japan 
(8) 
Tokyo(3), Osaka(2), Fukuoka(1), Nagoya(2) 
 
China 
(8) 
Regional Headquarter(1), Hong Kong(2), 
Taipei(2), Shanghai(1), Beijing(2) 
Guangzhou(1), 
Qingdao(1) 
Asia Pacific 
(5) 
Singapore(2), Sydney(2), Melbourne(1) Kuala Lumpur(1) 
MENA 
(1) 
Dubai(1) 
 
CIS 
(0)  
Moscow(1) 
Source: Invest Korea 
 
2.3.2. Performance and Contribution 
Invest Korea’s achievements so far has mixed bags of success stories and mishaps. 
While Invest Korea are doing their utmost best to promote success cases, which is by no 
means bad considering current government’s hard-line to public sector, there are 
murmurs that Invest Korea’s contribution to FDI is overstated, or limited.  
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Official result shows that, in notification terms, Invest Korea has succeeded in attracting 
more than 4 billion USD for the past 4 years, contributing more than 40% of national 
FDI. Given its size and budget, this is extremely impressive performance. What is more 
impressive is that its investment amount and contribution to national FDI are 
continuously rising, reaching 7.46 billion USD and 65%, respectively in 2009. 
Considering the investment climate around the world in 2009 was at its lowest, this is 
truly remarkable achievement.  
 
Table 8: Invest Korea’s Contribution to National FDI 
 (Unit: million USD) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
National Investment Notification 11,242 10,514 11,710 11,484 
National Investment Fund Arrival 9,105 7,770 8,356 - 
Invest Korea's Contribution to 
National FDI 
4,129 
(43.3%)
5,036 
(47.9%)
5,623 
(48.0%) 
7,461 
(65.0%)
Source: Invest Korea, KOTRA Company Management Report 2009 
 
It must be pointed out that there are potential loopholes in Invest Korea’s performance, 
repeatedly failing to silence the critics. With all respect to importance of investment 
amount, it is not the most important aspect of FDI, at least for now. The importance of 
acquiring as much foreign reserves as possible could not be overstated when it was 
established in 1998, as Korea was on the verge of moratorium. Since then, Korea has 
piled on the fourth largest foreign exchange reserves in the world, largely thanks to 
constant trade surplus, and unless there is intense speculation on Korean currency which 
is highly unlikely given circumstances, the immediate need for foreign reserve is 
presumably not as high as it used to be.  
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Rather, other impacts of FDI such as a technological transfer and an access to global 
market are getting more and more important. Countries keen on attracting FDI are 
putting much emphasis on innovation, R&D, technology, taking investment amount 
down the pecking order quite far, at best. In Invest Korea’s case, it comes as a big 
surprise that there have been very few attempts to reform Invest Korea to facilitate those 
structural changes for more than 10 years. Of course there were talks of strategic 
approach, targeting and selective promotion, all intended to boost Invest Korea’s overall 
contribution to national economy, not just FDI number. In the end, however, it turned 
out to be investment amount that determined the overall performance of Invest Korea.  
Admittedly, performance evaluation in public sector is far more difficult than private 
sector, where financial figures are predominantly acknowledged to judge its operation. 
It is true that there are no clear indicators how to quantitatively define and measure the 
public good, such as common-wellbeing or general welfare. Back to Invest Korea’ case, 
it is difficult to measure how Invest Korea’s activities boost innovation and enhanced 
technology, a point which advocates for investment amount claim that it can at least 
give objective and quantitative result. To make matters worse, there is no benchmark, as 
every country has different economic structure so that each IPA has its very own way of 
operation. They are not comparable to each other.  
Nevertheless, it is paramount to define how to evaluate Invest Korea’s performance, 
especially considering enormous budget and personnel dedicated to investment 
promotion. After reviewing theoretical background of FDI, which cite job creation and 
other spillover effects as main benefit, the thesis will test if Invest Korea manages to 
maximize those effects, largely through its internal evaluation system. The rationale 
behind it is that Invest Korea’s target, mandated from Ministry of Knowledge Economy, 
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will be reflected on its own evaluation system, so it would distribute resources 
optimally and give its personnel extra incentives to achieve it.  
 
3. Performance Evaluation System in Invest Korea 
 
3.1. Theoretical Background of FDI 
The backbone of investment promotion is that FDI has positive influence to national 
economy, by encouraging innovation, enhancing competitiveness, broadening market 
access and so on. Though there is a school of academics arguing FDI can be a poisoned 
chalice, or even a newly-evolved apostolic of relentless capitalism in neo-liberalism era, 
there is no doubt FDI can contribute significantly to national competitiveness, if 
managed properly. As most of academic studies on FDI so far were focused on the issue, 
to examine each factor in detail would be redundant, but brief listing will be enough to 
go further to see if those are well pursued by Invest Korea.  
One of the most commonly used methods to identify the impact of FDI is Porter’s 
diamond of national advantage. 4 factors, factor conditions, demand conditions, related 
and supporting industries, and firm strategy, structure, and rivalry, are suggested as a 
determining national competitiveness.  
Most of academic studies on FDI so far have highlighted the impact on factor 
conditions, as it covers most extensively. Mun (2006) has specifically pointed out that 
technological progress and productivity gain can be achieved by increase of capital 
investment. As to productivity gain, FDI, as a long-term capital, can lead investment 
flow into more productive sector, in order to maximize its long-term return on 
investment. But it is technological progress and development of a higher value-added 
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industry which FDI contributes most. Not only it enhances factors condition through 
technology transfer and innovations, it creates synergy effect with “related and 
supporting industries”, so called spillover. It can be a linkage to global network which 
might open a new market for the invested domestic company, or developing regional 
cluster. That is precisely why most countries target specific industries or activities 
which supposedly contribute more than the others. Usually, those are high-tech 
industries like IT and BT, or functions such as R&D or regional headquarters.  
It goes without saying that Invest Korea should reflect those findings on its target and 
evaluation system. The thesis will investigate if it is well designed to maximize the 
positive impact of FDI.  
 
3.2. External Evaluation System 
Invest Korea does not set its own target. Instead, annual evaluation of public company 
management conducted by the Ministry of Planning and Strategy covers investment 
promotion activities of Invest Korea as a part of KOTRA evaluation. Furthermore, 
individual contract between Korean government and president of KOTRA, and between 
KOTRA and head of Invest Korea also define what the targets are. Thus, it can be said 
that Invest Korea has 3 different set of targets, to which those must be related closely.  
 
3.2.1. Annual Evaluation of Public Company Management 
As a public company, KOTRA is obliged to be annually evaluated by Ministry of 
Planning and Strategy. This evaluation is of great importance to any public company in 
Korea, significantly affecting its budget as well as its existence even, that enormous 
amount of time and efforts are instilled. For Invest Korea, its evaluation on investment 
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promotion is illustrated in Table 9 
 
Table 9: Year-by-Year Performance Target for Invest Korea 
KPI 2008 2009 2010 
IK's Contribution to National FDI 51.2% 54% 55% 
Number of Major Projects 100 125 150 
Number of Grievance Resolutions 350 380 400 
Source: Invest Korea 
 
3.2.2. Other Targets for Invest Korea 
Apart from the targets set via KOTRA, the employment contract between the president 
of KOTRA and Korean government contains another set of investment promotion 
related targets. Ideally, those would be a subset of institutional target, or overlapping 
considerably at least. But neither is the case, so that extra targets are added on Invest 
Korea, even though Invest Korea in itself does not have any mandate to fulfill those 
targets.  
 
Table 10: Year-by-Year Performance Target for the President of KOTRA 
Objective 2008 2009 2010 
Investment Notification per Person 
(Thousand USD) 
9,000 11,000 13,000 
Drawing up Investment Proposal 
for Potential Korean Companies 
50 100 150 
Source: KOTRA 
 
The amount target requires Invest Korea to obtain 9,000,000 USD investment 
notification amount per staff, not of Invest Korea, but of whole KOTRA, in 2008, 
whereas discovering potential investment target companies and making 50 proposals for 
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them are also required. But what is more demanding is the annual growth rate, which 
reads average 20.19% and 73.21% respectively.  
If that is not complicated enough, another set of targets are added in the form of 
employment contract between KOTRA and head of Invest Korea. While the contract is 
extendable every 2 year subject to review, the targets are constantly changing.   
 
Table 11: Year-by-Year Performance Target for Head of Invest Korea 
Category 
Weight (%) 
Description 
06 07 08 09
Q 
u 
a 
n
t 
i 
t 
a 
t 
i 
v 
e 
National FDI Amount 30 20 10 5 
Investment 
Notification 10 10 5  
- National FDI amount set by 
ministry of knowledge 
economy 
Investment 
Fund Arrival 10    - 60% of notification target 
IK's Contribution 
to National FDI 10 10 5 5 
- Set by ministry of knowledge 
economy, around 50~60% 
Discovering Major 
Projects 20 10 10 5 
- Major investment projects 
discovered by head of IK 
- More than 10 mil USD of 
investment amount or S-graded 
project 
Investment Project 
Management   5 5 
- Number of investment 
projects reported by IK 
Customer Satisfaction 
Survey  15 5 10
- NCSI(National Customer 
Satisfaction Index) for 
KOTRA, conducted by 
ministry of strategy and finance
Income Generation  5 5 5 
- Revenue from organizing 
delegation, IK Journal  
Number of Customers    5 
- Number of Customers for 
KOTRA 
Q 
u 
a
l 
Contribution to 
Investment Attraction 20 10   
- Discovering potential target 
investor 
- Discovering major investment 
projects and management  
- Contribution to realization of 
investment  
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i 
t 
a 
t 
i 
v 
e 
Expansion and 
Invigoration of Overseas 
Network 
15 20   
- PR activities 
- Networking activities with 
investment-related 
organizations 
IK Management 15 15 20 20
- Establishing one-stop support 
system 
- IKP management 
- Human resource development
- Cooperation with regional 
governments 
- After-care service 
Innovation and Corporate 
Social Responsibility  5 3 3 
- Contribution to community 
service 
Participation on Business 
Ethics Training Course   2 2 - More than 10 hours per year 
Leadership   10 10
- Sharing and delivering 
mission of the organization 
Vision and Strategy 
Development   10 10
- Developing KPI, strategy and 
process to enhance the 
competitiveness of the 
organization 
Execution Strategy   20 20
- Efficiency and feasibility of 
management 
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: KOTRA, Invest Korea 
 
3.2.3. Impotency of Evaluation System 
Overall, the external evaluation frame for Invest Korea is very complicated. The targets 
are identified by 3 different channels, and those are not coherently related. Thus, it is 
inevitable that both inconsistency and irrelevancy have been causing negative effects on 
the efficiency of institution.  
Constantly changing targets are prime example of inconsistency. Compared to 2006, 4 
targets for head of Invest Korea are already dropped, while 9 new indicators have been 
introduced. Even core indicators like investment amount are not as clearly defined as it 
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should be, so that various indicators from notification to arrival, contribution and 
notification per person are used as ‘investment amounts’, all of those, barring 
contribution, are not true barometer of Invest Korea’s performance. Though IK’s 
contribution is exceptionally high, however controversial in itself it may be, using 
national FDI amount, of which nearly half is not attributed to Invest Korea, is ill-suited. 
Even notification per person, which ought to be good measure for investment amounts, 
defies the logic, counting the number of whole personnel in KOTRA, instead of Invest 
Korea as a denominator. Though some of administrative personnel can be notionally 
attributed to Invest Korea, as Invest Korea is apparently part of KOTRA, taking all the 
staff is clearly misreading the overall contribution of Invest Korea, especially when IK 
is no more than a quarter of KOTRA. This distinctive inconsistency left Invest Korea 
bewildered, resulting in a lack of clear vision and direction.  
With no disrespect to public companies’ much applauded principle of ‘serving 
common-wellbeing or general welfare’, it must be said that Invest Korea’s first and 
foremost goal, which by nature is to serve common-wellbeing and general welfare by  
enhancing Korean economy’s competitiveness, should not be distracted by issues of 
minor importance, not to mention of irrelevance. Unfortunately, a quick glance of 
evaluation frame reveals that a good number of indicators are completely, or partly 
irrelevant to the core operation of Invest Korea.  
Typical example is ‘income generation’. KOTRA is so-called a quasi-governmental 
body under the law on management of public bodies. It differs from a government-
owned corporation or, as OECD, World Bank and IMF calls, state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) like Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS), Korea Electric Power Corporation 
(KEPCO), both of which are classified as market-oriented, or Korea Tourism 
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Organization (KTO), Korea Minting and Security Printing Corporation (COMSCO), 
classified as semi market-oriented. The critical character which separates a quasi-
governmental body from government-owned corporation is whether the company is 
operating in competitive market, and eventually generating revenue, though it does not 
necessarily mean the company has to be profitable to maintain. KOTRA, including 
Invest Korea, is exempted from those competitive natures, and, to a certain extent, 
revenue generating, since it is recognized that its main goal will be best served without 
it. Hence, having income generation as one of the determinants of performance 
evaluation is contradictory. Moreover, the main source of income does not bear any 
relation to its performance, as more than 95% are generated from local governments and 
FEZs, by providing matchmaking and other on-site services to their investment 
promotion delegation. Combined with local government’s rather imprudent pursuit of 
delegation, around 60 delegations dispatched each year have been major source of 
disappointment due to continuous failure of proper preparation and identifying unique 
attraction point.  
Another irrelevancy can be found in the form of ‘number of customers’ as well as 
customer satisfaction survey, National Customer Satisfaction Index (NCSI). By defining 
its customer as local governments, FEZs and some accounting or legal companies 
working together in FDI promotion, it completely fails to evaluate how Invest Korea 
have served its true customer, foreign investors. Though there are several events to 
collect foreign investors’ opinion, notably Foreign Investment Forum (FIF) or frequent 
meetings where CEOs of foreign companies are invited, hosted by central government, 
there is no systematic route to evaluate Invest Korea’s performance by foreign investors. 
Rather, parties who can billed as partners are regularly grading Invest Korea’s 
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performance.  
 
3.2.4. Weak Linkage to the Core Value of FDI 
Already covered in the theoretical background of FDI, it is widely accepted that FDI 
can have positive influence to hosting country’s economy, by encouraging innovation, 
enhancing competitiveness, broadening market access, as long as it is properly managed. 
Among those, innovation and technological advance have established the most 
important driving forces in FDI promotion, at least in the developed countries, to which 
Korea believe itself to belong. That is why more and more countries are becoming 
selective in FDI, favoring cutting edge technology, high-value industry such as 
biotechnology and material, or specific activities which boost innovation most, like 
R&D and regional headquarter. Korea is no exception, often publicly declaring its 
intention to be a hub of northeast Asia, in which successful FDI attraction is expected to 
play significant role.  
When it comes to the implementation of this great ambition, it has not been as 
successful as hoped, much to Korean government’s dismay. It is not that Korea has not 
tried to attract high value, innovative industry. Rather, countless measures have been 
taken to signal its dedication to the cause such as reforming ministry in charge of FDI 
from ‘Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy’ to ‘Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy’. As far as Invest Korea is concerned, the execution has been wrong in spite 
of the right idea.  
Bound to a system in which it will be evaluated by the amount of notification amount, 
no matters what the industry is or how innovative the activity is, Invest Korea does not 
have any incentive to try to attract so-called target industries or R&D center, when 
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precious recourses can be reserved to support other project which would invest bigger 
amount, even though it is less innovative. This failure to encourage strategic investment 
promotion, caused by misdirected evaluation frame, has been Korea’s main undoing.  
 
3.3. Internal Evaluation System  
If external evaluation system for Invest Korea does not click all the boxes for successful 
FDI promotion, internal evaluation system should provide ample cover, though, as an 
institution itself, Invest Korea does not have any incentive to do so, except ethical 
responsibility to serve common wellbeing. Not only offering suitable incentives for 
strategic promotion, it also needs to balance its institutional target above mentioned.  
 
3.3.1. Evaluation for Overseas Branches 
It is KOTRA’s overseas branches, Korea Business Center, where actual promotion is 
taking place. So the internal evaluation system should have clear indication how the 
FDI promotion is managed. It consists of mainly two categories, project management 
and investment amount. While amount category literally represents investment amount 
itself, mostly notification from the corresponding countries for each KBC, project 
management represent qualitative aspect of investment project, supplementing the 
strategic dimension of evaluation frame.  
Table 12 shows the internal evaluation frame for the latest 3 years. Though there were 
categories like number of potential investors and 3-year trend amount, all of those are 
quickly scrapped after just one or two years after wide criticism from KBCs due to 
either heavy administrative burden or irrelevancy from day-to-day operation. 
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Table 12: Internal Evaluation Frame of Invest Korea 
Category 
Weight (%) 
Description 
2008 2009 2010
Project Management 57.14~ 60.00 75.00 50.00  
Total Project 35.00~ 37.33 45.00 40.00
- Aggregate points from all investment 
projects 
- To be confirmed at the end of business 
year 
New Project 15.00~ 16.00 22.50  
- Aggregate points from projects which 
started to be involved in corresponding 
year (subject to CRM registration) 
- To be confirmed at the end of business 
year 
Progress Rate 6.66~ 10.00 7.50 10.00
- Quarterly project management points 
- 1st quarter (15%) / 2nd quarter (40%) /  
3rd quarter (70%) / 4th quarter (100%) 
Investment Amount 
(Corresponding Year) 
25.00~ 
28.57 17.50 50.00  
Notification 12.50~ 14.29 8.75 25.00 - Investment amount noticed to INSC 
Arrival 12.50~ 14.29 8.75 25.00 - 60% of notification target 
Number of Potential 
Investors 
13.33~ 
15.00    
Number of Potential 
Investors 
13.33~ 
15.00   
- Number of investors registered and 
reported to be involved 
Investment Amount  
(3-year trend)  7.50   
Notification  3.75  
- Target : Average notification amount of 
3 previous years multiplied by growth 
rate of national FDI target 
- Performance : Average notification 
amount of corresponding year and 2 
previous year 
Arrival  3.75%  
- Target : 60% of notification target 
- Performance : Average arrival amount 
of corresponding year and 2 previous year
Source: Invest Korea, Annual Evaluation Guideline 2010 
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3.3.2. Determinant of Investment Amount Target 
Each KBC will be assigned certain amount of investment amount target to contribute to 
the institutional target. Several variables are considered in calculating the target number, 
including investment amount of last 3 years to see the general trend, exceptionally high 
single investment project which will severely distort the average value, the specific 
location such as tax heaven, and overall increase in institutional target. While it is nearly 
impossible to determine the target fairly to every each KBC, there has been ongoing 
discontent among KBCs that the target is unrealistic, if not unachievable, for many 
years. Negotiation over the institutional target is absolutely out of question, as it is a 
strongly top-down mandate from Foreign Investment Committee. What is more 
damaging than excessively high aggregate target is a ‘winner’s curse’ situation which 
discourages any KBC from over-performing. Every year, once the target is met, each 
KBC has a good incentive not to claim any further investment amount, though it will 
eventually harm the overall performance of Invest Korea as a whole, which leads to a 
typical example of fallacy of composition. To understand why it happens, it is necessary 
to have a close look at the determinants of investment amount target, shown in Table 13.  
 
Table 13: Determinants of Investment Amount Target 
Category 2007/2008 2009/2010 
Performance in Last 5 Years 85% 80% 
Number of Staff 5% 3% 
National Investment Amount in Last 5 Years 5% 7% 
Investment Amount from S and A Projects 5% 10% 
Source: Invest Korea 
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Other than 4 major categories, there are several fine tunings to avoid any distortion, so 
that any one-off investment with massive amount would not affect the next year’s target, 
though this exemption is given either to extremely big amount which is rarely 
happening, or as a carrot at the end of year when KBCs which have already hit the 
target are reluctant to claim the investment amount as their credit, which will be 
explained later on.  
The potential problem with this frame is that a KBC which had stellar performance one 
year will not be rewarded however remarkable its performance is, but will be punished, 
in a way, by much higher target next year. When every KBC will get the same 
recognition, or grade, as long as it achieves the target, and every extra cent over the 
target will be reflected to next year’s target, so that it will come back to haunt them later 
on, it is rational for any KBC not to claim its credit once the target is achieved. With 
more than 80% of target amount depends on previous performance, the evaluation 
frame systemically discourages KBCs to drop its performance level. It is why, every 
end of year, KOTRA head quarter and KBCs have a quarrel as to claiming credit for the 
notified investment amount. Even if KBC’s ‘No, thank you’ approach is destined to face 
cynical reproach from head quarter, desperate to meet the institutional target, this tug of 
war goes on every year. 
 
3.3.3. Project Management 
This category is inarguably the only one in which the qualitative aspect of investment 
project is evaluated. Like investment amount target, project management target is 
assigned by head quarter every year.  
Each project will be graded by grading committee in accordance with pre-determined 
  
 
 
29 
 
conditions such as investment size, significance of KBC’s involvement, and 
contribution to investment decision. The best grade is S, and A, B, and H in descending 
order will be graded, with different point. And each grade is again divided to normal 
and new, where ‘new’ refers to the project registered in the corresponding year, and 
produces higher point. This is designed to encourage continuous development of new 
investment project.  
 
Table 14: Investment Project Grading Guideline 
Grade Point Indispensible Condition Necessary Condition 
S+/S 6/4 
The concreteness, size and 
type of investment project 
should be verified by 
project manager,  
- visiting Korea and 
consultation to project 
manager (within 6 months)
1. Determinant 
A. Qualitative Condition 
- Significance of KBC's involvement 
- Contribution to investment decision  
B. Quantitative Condition 
- SOC, Retail, Leisure : at least 20 mil USD 
- Manufacturing, Logistics : at least 10 mil USD  
- R&D Center, High-tech, Regional HQ : at least 
2mil USD 
*High-tech industry is subject to definition from 
ministry of knowledge economy 
C. More than 5 support activities within a year 
including visiting Korea 
 
2. Project which fails to meet the requirements 
A. Positive influence on national economy should 
be approved by grading committee, despite failing 
to meet qualitative or quantitative requirements 
 
3. A project can be downgraded to A by grading 
committee, though it satisfied all the 
requirements 
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A+/A 3/1.5 
The concreteness, size and 
type of investment project 
should be verified by 
project manager,  
 
- investor to visit Korea and 
consultation with project 
manager (within 6 months)
- visiting investor by project 
manager  
- visiting investor by 
delegation from Invest 
Korea, regional 
government, ministry of 
knowledge economy and 
other relevant organizations
- attracting investment 
delegation including 
corresponding investor to 
Korea 
1. Determinant 
A. Qualitative Condition 
- Significance of KBC's involvement 
- Contribution to investment decision  
B. Quantitative Condition 
- SOC, Retail, Leisure : at least 10 mil USD 
- Manufacturing, Logistics : at least 5 mil USD 
- R&D Center, High-tech, Regional HQ : at least 
1mil USD 
*High-tech industry is subject to definition from 
ministry of knowledge economy 
C. More than 5 support activities within a year 
including visiting Korea 
 
2. Project which fails to meet the requirements 
A. Positive influence on national economy should 
be approved by grading committee, despite failing 
to meet qualitative or quantitative requirements 
 
3. A project can be downgraded to B by grading 
committee, though it satisfied all the 
requirements  
B+/B 
0.3/ 
0.1 
None 
A project which does not meet the requirements of S 
or A grade 
H 0 Non-gradable 
Cancellation or falling through of investment project
Significant lack of contribution or involvement to 
the project 
Source: Invest Korea, Annual Evaluation Guideline 2010 
 
Each KBC’s involvement to the project is reported to head quarter by internal 
management system, world-widely used Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP), though 
not necessarily most efficient. The promotion activities are divided into 8 categories, 
  
 
 
31 
 
including project registration, notification, and arrival.  
 
Table 15: Main Investment Promotion Activities in Invest Korea 
<Investment Promotion Steps> 
1. Step 1 (Promotion) 
- Providing information such as investment climate, on-line consultation, Arranging 
seminar or event 
- Monitoring fund arrival is also included 
2. Step 2 (Inquiry) 
- Providing investment information by request of investor 
3. Step 3 (Visiting Investor) 
- Visiting investor to discuss potential investment project 
4. Step 4 (Delegation) 
- Visiting investor with delegation from either one of Invest Korea, Central 
government, Regional government, or TFT 
- MOU signing ceremony is also included 
5. Step 5 (Investment Project) 
- Investment project management 
- Details of project such as industry, background and expected investment amount and 
time should be reported 
6. Step 6 (Visit to Korea) 
- Visiting Korea by investor 
- Visiting period, accommodation, schedule including meeting counterpart should be 
reported unless investor directly visit Invest Korea 
7. Step 7 (Investment Notification) 
- Investment notification on INSC 
- Higher than 3 step promotion activities should have been reported unless project has 
been managed 
8. Step 8 (Fund Arrival) 
- Investment fund arrival on INSC 
- Only applied to the reported notification on step 7 
Source: Invest Korea, Annual Evaluation Guideline 2010 
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Investment project grading system like the one in Invest Korea can be found in other 
IPAs, as it was initially introduced after series of benchmarking. The two notable 
features in Invest Korea are again, emphasis on investment amount, and new project.  
There is no doubt that big investment project is more likely to have greater economic 
impact than small one. But by defining a good project equivalent to a big project with 
extra conditions, it effectively rules out a small but innovative project which might have 
big spillover. Furthermore, as the project subject to grading is ante-investment, rather 
than post-investment, KBCs tend to exaggerate the project size since there is not a 
proper tool to verify it. Since INSC data only count investment amount per notification, 
not per project, additional investment step transaction under single project can be 
recognized as multiple investment projects, which eventually decrease the average 
amount of investment per project. That makes it very difficult to compare the average 
projected amount of registered project with the actual investment notification amount. 
Still, the average projected amount of registered investment project is significantly 
higher than actual notification amount, even more than 12 times in 2007.  
 
Table 16: Comparison between Average Amount in Registered Project and Actual 
Investment 
Year 
Registered Amount 
(Thousand USD) 
Actual Notification Amount
(Thousand USD) 
Disparity 
2006 72,286 13,746 526% 
2007 133,916 11,079 1,209% 
2008 42,255 11,489 368% 
2009 17,252 13,202 131% 
Source: Invest Korea, INSC 
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Another noticeable trend which hampers the efficiency of project management is the 
increasing number of projects. Faced with ever-increasing annual project points target, 
each KBC is forced to discover or develop more and more project every year to meet 
the target. And introduction of ‘Number of potential investors’ category, which 
effectively requires each KBC maintain certain number of investors, accelerated this 
trend, so that the number of projects has dramatically increased from 948 in 2006 to 
1,511 in 2007, nearly 60% of increase in a year. Though it has been steadied around 
1,500 per year, even decreasing a bit in 2009 largely due to removal of ‘Number of 
potential investors’ category, it remains that too many project are registered and 
managed. That has lead to the most significant problem Invest Korea is facing, the 
deterioration of project management standard.  
Table 17 shows that, while number of S and A projects, which are supposed to be good 
and tangible, have grown 36.54% and 14.40% respectively from 2006 to 2009, B 
projects have increased 43.42%, and 200 more H project, virtually non-existing in 2006, 
have been registered. Though the grading procedure have toughen up, it can be argued 
that substantial portion of increased number of investment projects fell on B graded 
project, which is deemed not as promising as S or A, or even on H graded project, 
deemed non-gradable.  
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Table 17: Year-by-Year Investment Project Grading Result by Invest Korea 
Year 
Grade 
2006 
2007 2008 2009 
Number of 
Projects 
Growth 
Rate 
Number of 
Projects
Growth 
Rate 
Number of 
Projects 
Growth 
Rate 
Total 948 1,511 59.4% 1,679 11.1% 1,479 -11.9%
S 52 80 53.8% 82 2.5% 71 -13.4%
A 257 227 -11.7% 297 30.8% 294 -1.0% 
B 638 842 32.0% 1,087 29.1% 913 -16.0%
H 1 362 36,100% 213 -41.2% 201 -5.6% 
Source: Invest Korea 
 
This has affected KBCs in two ways. First, by having to register more projects, it puts 
extra administrative burden to KBC. Though it pushes KBCs to be more active, thus 
giving higher probability to develop a project, which is vilified by the increased number 
of S and A projects, the net value of trade-off is clearly negative. Considering the time 
and efforts placed on even non-gradable projects as well as highly inefficient SAP‘s 
CRM program used by Invest Korea, the resulting inefficiency cannot be overlooked. 
Secondly, given certain capacity, KBC’s involvement in each project is bound to 
decrease. Table 18 shows that, for each project, only ‘Promotion’ activity, among 5 
different investment promotion activities Invest Korea does, has increased, while all the 
other activities have decreased. Given that promotion activity is by far the easiest like 
event promotion and providing information, thus less time-consuming and interactive, it 
clearly indicates that KBCs are less inclined to do more interactive, thus more efficient 
project management.  
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Table 18: Invest Korea’s Major Activities and Average Number of Activities per 
Project 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Number of Projects 948 1,511 1,679 1,479 
Promotion 
Total 3,706 4,592 5,990 7,119 
Per Project 3.91 3.04 3.57 4.81 
Inquiry 
Total 1,224 1,394 1,713 1,724 
Per Project 1.29 0.92 1.02 1.17 
Visiting Investor 
Total 1,245 1,147 1,414 1,504 
Per Project 1.31 0.76 0.84 1.02 
Delegation 
Total 1,403 1,263 1,353 1,004 
Per Project 1.48 0.84 0.81 0.68 
Visit Korea 
Total 507 477 499 620 
Per Project 0.53 0.32 0.30 0.42 
Total 8,085 8,873 10,969 11,971 
Per Project 8.53 5.87 6.53 8.09 
Source: Invest Korea 
 
3.4. Conclusion on Evaluation Frame of Invest Korea 
Overall, Invest Korea’s evaluation frame has several deficiencies, in spite of continuous 
benchmarking and internal efforts. In fact, Invest Korea has strived to improve its 
efficiency, including evaluation frame, not least joint research conducted by Mun 
(2008) to identify its “Mid-long term development strategy”. Numerous more 
recommendations and suggestions have been put forward, but were perceived to fall on 
deaf ears, to people’s dismay. But it is open secret that, as long as Invest Korea’s goal is 
solely focused on the amount of investment, not bad in itself, but has nothing to do with 
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enhancing competitiveness of Korean economy, any attempt to improve Invest Korea is 
destined to fail. It needs a structural overhaul, more focusing on innovation and 
technology.  
As each country, economy, and IPA has its own circumstances, any ‘cure-all’ solution 
can be effectively ruled out, amply testified by numerous benchmarking so far. The 
thesis, however, turn to case study of Netherlands’ IPA, Netherlands Foreign 
Investment Agency (NFIA), supposedly one of the leading IPAs in the world, to see 
how it has developed evaluation system. It is largely because the implementation of 
benchmarking is to blame, not the principle itself induced from benchmarking.  
 
4. Case Study: Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA) 
 
Over the years, Netherlands has firmly established herself as one of the main investment 
destinations. It was largely due to the fact that Netherlands is one of the tax heaven 
countries along with Bahamas and Bermuda. Most of FDI inflows to Netherlands are 
simply bypassing or circumventing to receive favorable tax treatment, so it is no 
coincidence that Netherlands is one of the biggest outbound investors as well. In terms 
of investment amount, Netherlands is the third largest investor to Korea, outnumbered 
only by USA and Japan. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that Netherlands is 
attractive investments destination on its own, on the ground of its strategic location in 
Europe. Numerous multi-national companies (MNCs) operating in Europe has set up 
their logistics facilities in much publicized ‘Gateway to Europe’.  
More often than not, Netherlands has been referred as a sound benchmarking model, 
resulting from supposed similarities in social and economic structures to Korea. Both 
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countries are small countries caught in a nut-cracker between regional heavyweights, 
not blessed with natural resources, though oil production in North Sea has played 
significant role in Dutch Economy, and most importantly, have opened their economy 
extensively to the rest of the world.  
NFIA is Netherlands’ national investment promotion agency, equivalent to Invest Korea 
in Korea. Founded in 1978 as an operational arm of the Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, it claims to have supported more than 2,500 organizations from 40 countries in 
setting up and/or expansion of MNCs. With all similarities between two countries and 
solid reputation NFIA has earned so far, a closer look at how NFIA operates would give 
Invest Korea meaningful insight how it can improve its own.  
 
4.1. General Overview of NFIA 
As a national investment promotion agency, NFIA is the only organization which runs 
oversea offices, representing Netherlands. As of March 2010, it runs 18 oversea offices, 
where around 60 staffs including locally hired personnel are working. Headquarter in 
Hague has six different divisions, management team, information management, project 
management which is divided into North American projects team and Asian & 
European projects team, marketing support, investment climate, and reception desk. It 
hires around 30 staffs.  
Annual budget is around 10 million Euro in 2009, but it would have been significantly 
higher had those 18 overseas offices paid the office rent charges. In fact, most NFIA 
overseas offices are under the same roof with Dutch embassies or consulates in the 
region and rent charges are paid by them.   
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Figure 4: Netherlands’ Investment Promotion System 
 
 
4.2. Comparison to Invest Korea  
NFIA’s annual report discloses its result in 3 categories; number of projects, investment 
amount, and number of direct jobs. Those numbers should be taken carefully, as 
technical definitions are quite different from those of Invest Korea.  
 
Table 19: Comparison between NFIA and Invest Korea 
Confirmation of Result 
NFIA 
Confirmation letter from foreign investor indicating that NFIA involvement has 
led to the company’s decision to implement an investment project in the 
Netherlands 
Or 
In case the company is not willing to sign confirmation letter due to 
confidentiality or so,  
- intake form submission,  
- confirmation of investment amount and the number of jobs by email or via 
press release, and  
- confirmation of establishment by registration to Chambers of commerce or by 
press release, or post on its corporate website.  
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Invest 
Korea 
Official registration to Investment Notification Statistics Center (INSC) 
 - registration of project to CRM before the notification date and managed 
since; or, 
 - report of investor relations higher than 3rd step (visiting investor) in the 
investment promotion steps to CRM  
Definition of Project 
NFIA 
a. Establishing a physical presence or expand/retain existing activities in the 
Netherlands 
b. by a foreign company, not being a venture capitalist, of which the ownership 
is for at least 50% foreign 
c. by incorporation of a new company or expansion thru (or by the acquisition 
of ) an existing company in the Netherlands 
Or 
a. Outsourcing of activities such as logistics or technological cooperation 
(TMS) 
b. by a foreign company, not being a venture capitalist, of which the ownership 
is for at least 50% foreign 
c. to a provider or institute located in the Netherlands 
d. whereby the Netherlands is in competition with one or more European 
countries 
Invest 
Korea 
Any project under Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) including 
acquisition of shares or equity of a domestic corporation or business, provision 
of long-term loans to invested domestic corporations, a contribution to a non-
profit organization 
a. Minimum investment amount of 50 million KRW 
b. 10% or more of the voting stocks or total invested capital owned by foreign 
Or 
In case foreign investment ratio is less than 10%,  
- a contract that allows dispatch or assignment of executives; 
- a contract for the delivery or purchase of raw materials or products for a 
minimum of 1 year; or, 
- a contract for provision or import of technologies, or joint R&D. 
Number of Projects 
NFIA 
Confirmed projects, which acquired ‘confirmation letter’ from foreign investor 
Complete project are not counted as an official result 
 - investment of less than 500,000 Euro or less than 5 new jobs 
 - insufficient involvement from NFIA 
 - confidentiality 
Invest 
Korea 
Number of projects registered to CRM 
 - graded S, A, and B, excluding H 
Investment Amount 
NFIA 
a. Confirmation letter from foreign investor, indicating therein what investment 
amount the company expects to realize within 3 years 
b. Per project, 3 year projection by investor 
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Invest 
Korea 
a. Official registration to Investment Notification Statistics Center (INSC) 
b. Year-by-year count 
Number of Direct Jobs 
NFIA 
a. Confirmation letter from foreign investor, indicating therein how many direct 
jobs the company expects to realize within 3 years 
b. Per project, 3 year projection by investor 
Invest 
Korea a. No specific rule for job creation / retention 
Source: NFIA, NFIA Annual Report 2010, Invest Korea 
 
To claim credit, NFIA is obliged to acquire a confirmation letter from foreign investor, 
indicating that NFIA involvement has led to the company’s decision to implement an 
investment project in the Netherlands. This is by far stricter than Invest Korea, where 
any investment can be claimed as long as they were registered and managed by its own 
CRM system, regardless of IK’s role in investment decision. This disparity partly 
accounts for the massive difference in investment amount result, which will be shown 
later on.  
Another contributing factor in smaller investment amount is a scope of investment 
project. While IK abide by generally accepted definition of FDI, set by United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), NFIA uses narrower definition, 
which excludes large number of projects that otherwise would have been credited. The 
most important character of project is competition with one or more European countries. 
This clause effectively rules out considerable number of projects in retail or most of 
service industries such as real estate development where domestic consumption is main 
target. The rationale is that it would come anyway, with or without support of NFIA, so 
it will not be counted as a proper project. The other important character is minimum 
requirement of 50% share. This clause deviates from usual FDI definition of 10% 
shareholding, but NFIA insists to have majority share in order to guarantee long-term 
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economic relationship. Acknowledging outsourcing of activities is also noticeable, since 
it sometimes does not generate any monetary transfer, but is still deemed to be as 
important to economy as normal FDI.  
Quantitative evaluation of project is done in both organizations. NFIA counts confirmed 
projects, which successfully acquired confirmation letter from investor. Meanwhile, 
Invest Korea does not count just the number of projects, but grade each project in 
accordance with its own system. Thus, IK evaluates not only the number, but also 
quality of project at once. More importantly, however, the status in which the project is 
counted differs. It is only when the project has been realized, and established that NFIA 
can claim its credit, whereas Invest Korea looks potential project, equivalent to ‘Active’ 
status in NFIA. This has led to criticism to Invest Korea regarding the integrity of a 
project, on the ground of a lack of significant involvement to the realized project, not 
more so than projects from financial institutions.  
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Figure 5: Project Management Process in NFIA 
 
Source: NFIA 
 
Investment amount is relatively straight forward criteria. While NFIA looks at projected 
amount for the next 3 years, Invest Korea strictly recognizes the notified amount to 
Investment Notification Statistics Center (INSC), Korea’s official FDI statistics desk, 
on year-by-year basis. Though projected amount does not guarantee the actual 
investment amount, especially when the economic climate is rapidly changing, as is  
last couple of years, it is plausible for NFIA to assume that the confirmation letter is to 
be written with good faith at the time of writing. So long as the actual investment 
amount does not deviate greatly from its projection, in fact, it should converge in the 
long-run, the difference is negligible.  
It is an anomaly to a certain extent that Invest Korea does not count the number of direct 
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jobs, as it is regarded one of the core added-values to IPAs, let alone NFIA. Though 
fully aware of the importance of job creation, intensified by ever-increasing 
unemployment rate and instability in the job market, Korean government has failed to 
set a concrete target. While technically tricky to measure the full extent of direct jobs 
created or retained by FDI - for example, if an investment project with 10% of foreign 
shareholding creates 100 direct jobs, it is debatable to determine the impact of FDI at 
either 100, full number of job creation, or 10, in proportion to foreign shareholding. But 
it is not impossible, and NFIA and other IPA’s cases prove that it is not as controversial 
as it seems. NFIA’s stricter definition of FDI can be handy, for example, as full number 
can be credited on the basis of the majority shareholding requirement. 
 
4.3. Recent Result of NFIA 
Bearing those differences in mind, NFIA’s recent results are rather modest. The number 
of project is not comparable, as NFIA does not reveal the number of projects under their 
management. But the number of confirmed projects is significantly lower, averaging 
117.4 projects per year for the last decade. It is in gradual upturn, though unprecedented 
economic turmoil has dented the trend in 2009.  
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Figure 6: Number of Confirmed Projects Supported by the NFIA on a Yearly 
Basis over the Period 2000-2009 
 
Source: NFIA Annual Report 2010 
 
The average investment amount is 725.2 million Euro per year. But if the exceptionally 
high figure of 2009, accounted for by the realization of two very capital intensive 
investment projects, are to be excluded, then the average investment amount goes down 
to 456.7 million Euro per year. This is where the most striking difference between 
Invest Korea and NFIA lies, as Invest Korea claims ten fold as much as NFIA. It is 
mainly down to by far stricter rule of acknowledging the credit rather than Invest 
Korea’s superior efficiency.  
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Figure 7: Investment Amount in Million Euros on a Yearly Basis over the Period 
2000-2009 
 
Source: NFIA Annual Report 2010 
 
The number of direct jobs is only applicable to NFIA, as Invest Korea does not count 
job creation or retention. Those numbers include not only direct job creation by initial 
investment, so-called ‘Greenfield investment’, but also additional job by ‘Brownfield 
investment’, such as expansion of an existing activity, addition of a new activity to an 
existing company, and even retention from potential closure or downsizing due to 
restructuring processes. It is hardly surprising that job creation is one of main pillars of 
NFIA, given the dire strait of general employment situation in Western Europe, where 
unemployment rate has been chronically high.  
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Figure 8: Number of Direct Jobs on a Yearly Basis over the Period 2000-2009 
 
Source: NFIA Annual Report 2010 
 
4.4. Evaluation System in NFIA 
 
4.4.1. External Evaluation 
NFIA’s target is mandated from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, where overall FDI 
policy is designed. 3 main targets are set in the form of number of confirmed projects, 
investment amount, and number of direct jobs. These categories are consistently quoted 
in its annual report as well. As of 2010, 130 confirmed projects, 400 million Euro of 
investment amount, and 2,500 direct jobs are identified as an annual target. Usually, 
those targets are set by Ministry of Economic Affairs, later reviewed by NFIA, and 
finally negotiated. With no explicit target for national FDI, unlike Korea, it is always 
subject to negotiation depending on its annual budget, economic climate and so on. It is 
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quite a contrast to Invest Korea, which has very strict top-down approach, with Foreign 
Investment Committee being driving force to determine the target.  
Consistency, simplicity, clarity of the targets must be applauded, as those provide any 
organization with much needed stability and focus. The three targets have been used for 
some years without major overhaul, and easy to be delivered and shared within 
organization. Invest Korea’s targets are, however, frequently changing, too diverse and 
somewhat ambiguous, as is shown in Table 11 and 12. But the most damaging are 
irrelevant targets such as customer satisfactory survey. With its budget and personnel at 
stake, Invest Korea cannot be blamed for using enormous resources on irrelevant targets, 
though those resources can easily be re-directed to enhance its efficiency.  
 
4.4.2. Internal Evaluation 
It is this area where the biggest difference between NFIA and Invest Korea lies. As 
shown in Table 19, NFIA is adopting by far stricter rule for claiming credit, as well as 
endorsing longer term project management by recognizing projected estimation for 
investment amount and job creation up to 3 years.  
5 main categories, with equal weight, are used to evaluate each NFIA overseas office’s 
performance. Obviously, 3 main institutional targets, number of confirmed projects, 
investment amount, and number of direct jobs, are included and supplemented by 
number of new intakes as well as proportion of number of projects in targeting area. 
Targeting area can be defined as a certain types of function, like R&D, European 
headquarter (EHQ), manufacturing, shared service center (SSC), training, assembly, and 
financial corporation in prioritized sectors such as life sciences, information technology, 
creative industry, and logistics, etc. Those focus areas have been identified as having the 
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most positive impact on Dutch economy, so that special attention should be paid. As of 
2010, at least 18% of all projects should fall on the targeting area. 
  
Figure 9: Prioritized Sectors in NFIA 
 
Source: NFIA 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Initially regarded as a reliable source of foreign reserve, while understandable 
considering how desperate Korean economy was in the middle of crisis, the attention on 
FDI has been somewhat re-directed to more strategic aspects such as technological 
transfer. And there are broadening views that those impacts can trigger another step up 
for the Korean economy, which is somewhat stagnated for the last decade. That is 
precisely why, despite wide criticism on globalization which MNCs are more than 
happy to exploit and financial instability it may bring, there is no doubt that the current 
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trend that puts FDI in the center of economic development policy will go on at least for 
the foreseeable future. Invest Korea, as a national investment promotion agency, will 
inevitably be asked to lead the front line. So far, compared to NFIA, Invest Korea’s 
performance seems to be either immeasurably good, or severely distorted. And the 
thesis argued that the latter is more likely. The distortion, largely due to its flawed 
evaluation frame, have damaged Invest Korea’s efficiency substantially lot and need to 
be rectified sooner than later. Several suggestions can be made with regard to it.  
 
5.1. Reducing the Number of Projects 
As already discussed, the average number of projects per staff in Invest Korea is much 
higher than that of NFIA, resulting in insufficient support to each project. First and 
foremost blame should be on external evaluation frame which requires around 1,000 
projects per year. But equally, the ever-increasing internal target should share the blame, 
as it forces KBCs to manage more than their fair capability.  
Substantial reinforcement in budget and personnel is highly unlikely when downsizing 
is the order of the day in public sector. Thus, it is necessary to reduce the total number 
of projects significantly. Unofficial poll by Invest Korea in early 2009 revealed that less 
than half of investment managers allocate more than 50% of their working time in 
investment promotion, whereas around quarter replied less than 30% or so because of 
extra duties like marketing, market scan. Conservative estimation can lead to the 
conclusion that around 60 investment managers, 30 full time investment managers from 
headquarters, which is half of total number, and 30 full time local staff, are working on 
about 1,500 investment projects. Compared to NFIA, where 1,000 investment projects 
are managed with more or less same number of personnel, it is 50% higher. It is no 
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wonder then the quality of investment promotion activities differ as such. There is no 
way for Invest Korea to maintain the status quo without sacrificing the efficiency. If not 
one third, matching NFIA level, at least 20% of decrease is inevitable to boost the 
overall efficiency.  
 
5.2. More Focus on Strategic Sectors 
It is no surprise that every KBC is frustrated by continuous dissonance between R&D, 
innovation rhetoric and evaluation frame focusing on investment amount. Then it is of 
absolute importance to have affordable and consistent system to accommodate bigger 
dedication to R&D and innovation.  
UK Trade & Investment, United Kingdom’s trade and investment promotion agency, 
offers a good benchmark. It has been running a Comprehensive Spending Review 
(CSR) settlement, which requires UKTI to prioritize and deliver the targets. According 
to the latest one, CSR 2007 which covers the period of 2008-09 to 2010-11, it sets 5 
targets, 4 in delivery targets and the other in operational performance target.  
There are 2 FDI related targets, all of which focus on innovation. Target 1, which 
stipulates UKTI to attract high value foreign direct investment to the UK, requires 
UKTI to achieve at least 525 involved inward investment project successes annually, of 
which: (a) at least 125 should be high value; (b) at least 285 should be good quality; and 
(c) at least 70% should agree that UKTI or its regional development agency (RDA) 
partner had significant favorable influence on the decision to locate or expand in the UK, 
or on the scale or scope of the project. And last but not least, minimum 30 of the good 
quality or high value projects should involve additional R&D activity in the UK. ‘High 
value’ and ‘good quality’ projects refers what have been identified by academic 
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research as likely to be associated with a positive impact on UK productivity, in 
particular through knowledge spillovers and increases in knowledge intensive economic 
activity in the UK. Usually, if the project has R&D as the main focus, or offer 
something new to the world, to the sector, or to UK business models or technical 
processes at the site, it is generally accepted as ‘high value’ or ‘good quality’. 
Meanwhile, Target 3, which stipulates UKTI to increase the quantity of R&D activity in 
the UK through business internationalization, requires at least 1,000 businesses increase 
their R&D activity in the UK as a result of UKTI support, including at least 70 FDI 
R&D projects. 
Like NFIA, these targets are supposedly implemented to boost promotion activities in 
strategic sectors. Without it, there is no guarantee the actual benefit of FDI can be fully 
materialized, especially given amount-oriented evaluation frame.  
It is not that Korea is indifferent to innovation and R&D aspect of FDI, but rather, 
improperly implemented evaluation frame has continuously failed to provide enough 
incentive or mandate to pursue it. Invest Korea has long been arguing that those factors 
should be included in its evaluation frame, most recently in its ‘Mid-long term 
investment promotion improvement plan’ at the end of 2009. There, it suggested two 
models, albeit vaguely.  
 
Performance Evaluation = β + β1 (Investment Amount) + β2 (Job Creation) + β3 
(Number of Projects in Strategic Industries) + β4 (Service) 
 
Performance Evaluation = β + β1 (Investment Amount + Number of Projects) + β2 (Job 
Creation + Increase in Consumption) + β3 (Number of Projects in Strategic Industries + 
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R&D Activities) + β4 (Service + Ombudsman) 
 
Technical issues including accuracy of estimation and difficulty in quantification of 
qualitative indicators remains unsolved. More importantly, no model is proved to be 
dominant over the other yet, but at least any attempt to deviate from current amount 
obsessed frame will not only be whole-heartedly welcome by Invest Korea but enable 
Korea economy to get the best out of FDI.  
 
5.3. Practicality of Target  
Korean government’s ambitious plan in 2007 to double the FDI amount was painfully 
ill-timed, as it was announced just before the worst economic crisis since the Great 
depression. Equally baffling was its deliberate ignorance of changing economic climate 
and consequent inflexibility, in spite of the clear indications from everywhere that it is 
not possible to achieve the target. That persistence has mirrored to Invest Korea, so that 
the national investment amount target, which in turn determines Invest Korea’s target, 
increases every year in double digit, regardless of economic climate. Even project 
management target, counted by points, increases every year, as if it does rather naturally 
like inflation. 
It is obvious that the investment cannot increase for good and even more so in economic 
turmoil in last 2 years. Furthermore, project management cannot be expanded, not to 
mention without reinforcement.  
There is some part of truth that the more ambitious target will lead to better 
performance, as it will definitely push the organization harder. But there is also a critical 
point where the ambition and hardship take its toll, and rational planning and 
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practicality prevails. It is the latter that Korea needs more, so does Invest Korea. 
 
 
 
The most commonly used cliché to justify more FDI in Korea is the FDI performance 
index, the relative ratio of FDI inflow to gross domestic production (GDP), in which 
Korea ranks 130th. Despite the general tendency that FDI performance ratio is lower in a 
developed country, particularly for big economy such as Japan(135th), Germany(108th) , 
and USA (115th), it does not bode well with Korean government, as other Asian 
economic powerhouses like Hong Kong, ranked no lower than 1st, and Singapore (7th) 
are doing well. Rather more powerful argument is the proportion of FDI stock to GDP, 
where Korea is significantly lower than worldwide average. But again, this figure must 
be read with caution, since different conditions like as economic policy, development 
stage, and economic structure are all decisive factors in FDI, so that there is no golden 
rule for FDI. Thus, it is imperative to realize that absolute number term is not as 
important as it is perceived, but having a right policy and implementation plan is.  
 
Table 20: FDI Proportion to GDP 
Country Proportion (%) Country Proportion (%)
USA 15.1 China 10.1 
Britain 48.6 Hong Kong 573.0 
Germany 19.0 Japan 3.0 
EU 40.9 Korea 12.3 
Developed Countries 
Average 
27.2 Worldwide Average 27.9 
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
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5.4. Conclusions 
 
The thesis has maintained that, in spite of impressive performance record so far, the 
evaluation system in Invest Korea is flawed, externally and internally. Inconsistency and 
irrelevancy have played big role, failing to provide Invest Korea with solid platform to 
maximize the positive impact of FDI. It turned out that the evaluation system is quite 
impotent that it fails to lead KBCs to right direction, and its weak linkage to the core 
value of FDI exposed serious lack of proper strategies.  
Several recommendations have been put forward to improve the efficiency of Invest 
Korea. Reducing the number of projects will enhance the quality of investment 
promotion activities, while more focus on strategic sectors would lead to the 
development of ‘high value’ and ‘good quality’ project. Finally, rational and practical 
targeting can pave a way for right policy and implementation plan.  
Finally, it should be stressed that, in spite of numerous academic researches, the 
causality between FDI and national competitiveness, which this thesis assumed, is not 
as robust as it is generally perceived. Thus, any attempt to reform Invest Korea should 
be preceded more rigorous studies on the real impact of FDI. And further research 
focusing on more technical side of accommodating multiple variables into evaluation 
frame will complement the thesis well. 
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